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Abstract
The twin goals of economic efficiency and social equity often seem at odds, particularly in
the debate over two marine policy approaches: firm-level regulation of inputs and outputs
(‘‘command and control’’) and individual transferable quotas. This paper examines the debate
over social equity in a US fishery that transitioned from command and control to individual
transferable quotas—the mid-Atlantic clam fishery. The analysis draws on 17 years of data on
fishing trips, vessel ownership, tradable property rights ownership, and output market shares.
The results show that no segment of the industry was disproportionately adversely affected by
the regulatory change; however, they also demonstrate the emergence of a new sector in the
industry, which is predominantly made up of former small-scale harvesters.
r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Given the extensive economic literature on the theoretical advantages of tradable
property rights over command-and-control systems (input/output regulation), the
persistence of traditional regulatory mechanisms in US fishery policy appears
incongruous. In US fisheries, a tradable property right takes the form of an
individual transferable quota [ITQ], or individual fishing quota, denoting a share of
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the annually specified total allowable harvest.1 Much of the resistance to the use of
individual transferable quotas in the US centers on the concern that ITQs will
change participants’ relative positions in the fishery—in particular the fear that
small-scale fishermen will be disadvantaged relative to larger producer. Despite the
economic arguments that ITQs produce gains in the aggregate, this fundamental
debate over the distribution of gains from increased efficiency, and of losses from
restructuring, remains a persistent debate [1–5].
ITQ-based systems were implemented in five US marine fisheries by the mid-
1990s.2 Controversy over their re-distributive effects led to legal actions against the
federal marine regulatory agency, the National Marine Fishery Service, and to a
moratorium on the use of ITQs in any additional US marine fisheries in the 1996
reauthorization of Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
[2,6].3 Expiration of the moratorium leaves fisheries managers with the difficult issue
of evaluating the distributional issues surrounding ITQs. Existing legislation guiding
fishery management reveals a preference for policies that are considered to be
equitable [6–9]; thus, an examination of this issue is timely.
In what follows, we present evidence on the changes in industry composition that
occurred in the mid-Atlantic surf clam (Spisula solidissima) and ocean quahog
(Arctica islandica) fishery,4 which was regulated first with command and control and
then with tradable property rights. In contrast with earlier studies that focused on
individual fishing vessels, this analysis is based on a unique data set that permits
differentiation of firms based on their size and on their degree of integration (defined
by vertical integration with processing sector [processor], horizontal integration
across boats [fleet], or no integration [independents]). These data allow us to
explicitly address the concern that ITQs will drive small-scale fishermen out of the
fishery. Second, it allows us to identify an important change in the industry: the
transition of many small-scale fishermen into a new business model, that of leasing
ITQs to other harvesters. Our firm-level analysis shows that there is little evidence
that the small-scale harvester was disadvantaged relative to the larger-scale
harvester. Additionally, the results show that a vessel-level analysis misrepresents
the change in industry composition, a result that has fueled much of the policy
debate in the US.
1The Magnuson–Stevens Act states that an individual fishing quota shall be considered a permit and
does not constitute a right or title to any fish before they are harvested.
2ITQs were implemented in the middle Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog, the North Pacific halibut,
the North Pacific sablefish, and the South Atlantic wreckfish fisheries.
3The 1996 reauthorization of the Magnuson–Stevens Act, the main legislation governing fisheries
regulation, imposed a moratorium on the use of tradable property rights in any additional U.S. marine
fisheries until the year 2000 [Title III, Section 303, 104–297]. During the 106th Congress, the moratorium
was extended until October 2001. The Magnuson–Stevens Reauthorization Act of 2000, introduced on
June 29, 2000, by U.S. Senator Olympia Snowe (R-Maine), extended the moratorium on the new
implementation of tradable property rights in U.S. fisheries until October 1, 2003. The moratorium has
since expired.
4Unless otherwise noted, discussion refers to both surf clams and ocean quahogs.
2. Evaluation of individual transferable quotas
The theoretical literature on ITQs demonstrates the potential for substantial gains
in productive efficiency and substantial reduction of over-capitalization in fisheries,
see [10–13]. The elimination of redundant capital has been empirically validated in
several analyses of ITQ systems around the world. (See for example [14–16]). Despite
the efficiency gains of ITQs, the issues of equity and social impacts of regulation
remain critical to policy evaluation [6,9,17,18].
The concern over the balance of equity and economic efficiency is best
summarized by the National Standards for Conservation and Management.
Standard Four states (see 16 USC. yy 1851(4):
If it becomes necessary to allocate or assign fishing privileges among various
United States fishermen, such allocation shall be (A) fair and equitable to all such
fishermen; (B) reasonably calculated to promote conservation; and (C) carried out
in such manner that no particular individual, corporation, or other entity acquires
an excessive share of such privilegesy
Most of the evaluations of ITQs have verified economic gains in the aggregate,
which has left the equity question unanswered. Opponents of ITQs in fisheries
interpret the empirical evidence of reduction of capacity to mean that ‘‘small
producers’’ will be faced with economic realities that make exiting the industry their
only viable option, leading to domination of the industry by large fleet owners and
firms that are vertically integrated through harvesting and processing. The costs of
these disputes include both lawsuits and considerable burdens on the managerial
process. Two examples of lawsuits over this issue are: Sea Watch International, et al.
v. Secretary of Commerce, 762 F. Supp. 370 (1991) and Alliance Against IFQs, et al.
v. Secretary of Commerce 84 F.3d 343 (9thCir. 1996). In the fishery examined in this
paper, the plaintiffs in Sea Watch International, et al., v. Robert Mosbacher argue
that the implementation of ITQs violated the national equity and fairness standard,
National Standard Four of the Magnuson–Stevens Act, because it was intended to
drive a particular group of individuals—single-vessel owners and small-fleet
owners—out of fisheries.
The policy debate over tradable property rights in fisheries, therefore, centers on
the issues of whether and how tradable permits alter the composition of the industry
from the prevailing structure under traditional command-and-control regulation.
Unless implemented in an emerging fishery free of prior regulation, industry
stakeholders’ positions on ITQs will be based on their position under existing
regulations—which in most US fisheries is some form of command and control,
broadly defined. Therefore, in this paper we examine how the fishery composition
changes using command and control as the baseline, acknowledging that this initial
welfare distribution may in fact not be socially or economically optimal.
The mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery was subject to command-
and-control regulation from 1979 through 1989, but has been governed by ITQs
since 1990. The tension between small-scale harvesters and larger-scale harvesters
and processors has been a recurrent theme in fisheries management and was a
volatile issue in the clam fishery [19,20]. This paper uses 17 years of input and output
data as well as firm identifiers to determine whether the implementation of ITQs
favored one type of firm (independent, fleet, or vertically integrated) over another, as
reflected in industry composition. This case study has two important implications.
First, while there is empirical evidence of a change in industry composition, analysis
shows that ITQs did not produce an inequitable outcome in this fishery, implying
that the debate over ITQs should be refocused on issues of firm behavior under
policy change and ITQ design. Second, this case study identifies an important way in
which firms adapt their behavior—giving up harvesting in favor of leasing their ITQs
to other harvesters; this vital sector must be included in any accurate welfare analysis
of the industry.
3. Empirical evidence of changes in industry composition
With annual production valued at over $48 million, the mid-Atlantic surf clam
and ocean quahog fishery provides almost the entire supply for domestic processed
clam products [21]. The outputs of the surf clam fishery include canned clam
chowder, canned minced clams, canned sauces and juices, and breaded products.
The ocean quahog is found further from shore and at greater depth than the surf
clam. Both clam species are sessile species that are harvested using a hydrologic
dredge. The main difference between harvesting the two clam species is that the
length of the hose to harvest the ocean quahog is greater than that to harvest surf
clams, and the length of a ocean quahog trip is longer than a surf clam trip (typically
24 h compared to 8 h). The same vessels can be used for both species; the only
necessary gear change is the change to a longer hose before an ocean quahog trip.
Location of the clam beds, as well as the varying properties of the beds (for example,
average size of clam and quality of meat), is common knowledge in the industry. The
clam biomass is located off the shores of Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey,
New York, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Maine, with commercial stocks
concentrated off the shore of northern New Jersey.
3.1. Regulatory history
The surf clam was harvested as early as 1870, but significant quantities were not
harvested until the 1950s, with effort expanding rapidly between the 1950s and early
1970s. This growing pressure on the resource was exacerbated by a shock to the clam
population when anoxic waters off the coast of New Jersey killed off large portions
of the surf clam stock. In 1977 the creation of the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management
Council, under the framework of the Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (Public Law 94–265), provided the mechanism to regulate effort in
the fishery. The first approach used by the management council was limiting access
and establishing a total allowable catch. The limited access system granted licenses to
vessels that had been harvesting surf clams but prohibited any new vessels from
harvesting surf clams.
As fishermen raced for a share of the total catch, the average allowable fishing
hours fell from 36 hours a week in 1979 to 6 h a week in 1984. The increasing
stringency of surf clam regulations left the vessels idle for increasingly longer
portions of the harvesting season. The cost of idle capital, as well as technological
innovation in the processing sector, displaced fishing effort to the previously
underutilized ocean quahog. From 1980 to 1984 the total ocean quahog harvest was
16,269,458 bushels. The total harvest of ocean quahogs over 1985–1989 was
22,879,392, an increase of 40.6% over the previous 5-year total.
By the mid-1980s, rapid growth in harvesting capacity and resulting inefficiencies
prompted a debate over the establishment of tradable property rights. While a
tradable property rights system for surf clams was being negotiated, beginning in the
mid-1980s, it was clear that allocations would be based on some form of historical
harvest quantities.5 A critical aspect of the allocation mechanism was that the
property right would be distributed on a vessel basis, not directly to the vessel owner;
thus, the property right asset was embedded in the vessel asset. While some boats
that were licensed for the surf clam/ocean quahog fishery were not being actively
used, now there was an incentive to put them into production in order to establish a
catch history. As a result, while the number of allowed vessels could not change
under limited access policies, the number of active vessels increased immediately
prior to the implementation of ITQs.
Debate over property rights in the clam fishery spanned a decade, and a central
concern was that independents would be disadvantaged in their allocation [20,23].
Amendment Eight: Fishery Management Plan for the Atlantic Surf Clam and Ocean
Quahog Fishery, finalized the allocation formula [24].6 The surf clam allocation
included vessel catch (80%) and vessel capacity (20%), while the ocean quahog
allocation was based solely on vessel catch. For vessels harvesting surf clams the
historical catch was equal to the vessel’s total harvest over 1979–1988 (counting the
years 1985–1988 twice and dropping the vessel’s worst 2 years). Each vessel’s catch
ratio was the vessel’s historical catch divided by the sum of all vessels’ historical
catch. The vessel’s cost factor was equal to the product of the vessel length, width
and volume. The vessel’s cost ratio was equal to the vessel’s cost factor divided by
the sum of the cost factors over all vessels.
For vessels harvesting ocean quahogs the historical annual catch was equal to the
vessel’s average annual harvest over 1979–1988 (dropping the vessel’s worst year).
Each vessel’s catch ratio was the vessel’s historical annual catch divided by the sum
of all vessels’ historical annual catch. The vessel’s initial ocean quahog allocation
was equal to the vessel’s catch ratio.
The system was designed such that the ITQ is the percentage of the total allowable
catch held by the vessel. Once the total allowable catch has been determined (in
5The formal negotiations over ITQs began with a discussion paper written and circulated by the
management council in 1986 [22].
6Amendment Eight: Fishery Management Plan for the Atlantic Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog Fishery
was approved by the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council in cooperation with the National Marine
Fisheries Service and the New England Fishery Management Council in 1988.
quantity of bushels) the vessel’s allocation is its ITQ (in percentage) multiplied by the
total allowable harvest. The allocation is the quantity of bushels that the vessel has a
right to harvest. There were no restrictions placed on concentration of ownership.
Prior to initial implementation the claim to ITQs was tied to each currently active
vessel; after implementation the property right was disaggregated from the vessel and
could be traded as a separate asset. Amendment Eight permitted a firm to retain
ownership of its ITQ even if it terminated harvesting and sold its capital, allowing
the firm to lease its quota to harvesters.
ITQs were implemented in 1990, and led to a significant reduction in the number
of vessels in the industry, as predicted by economic models of tradable property
rights in fisheries. Initially, some industry participants tried to create a niche for
brokers of allocations; however, this sector never fully developed and transfers have
been dominated by bilateral transactions between harvesters and owners of ITQs.
3.2. Data
The data used in this research were compiled from the vessel records of every
fishing trip made by every vessel during the years 1980–1999. These vessel records are
mandated by fishery regulations and are referred to as vessel logbooks.7 This
information on each fishing trip was matched with vessel license records that include
vessel characteristics.8 The concept of ‘‘firm’’ is used for the individual, partnership,
or company that owns either vessels active in the fishery or ITQs or both. To
differentiate capital and harvests by firm type, we matched each registered vessel
owner with its unique firm identifier using a file of true owners.
True owners are defined according to the basic concept of a firm—decision-
making agents that own vessels and decide how to use them. An individual owner
could own multiple vessels where each vessel could be registered under a different
owning corporation. An owner database that maps corporations into parent firms
was used to distinguish between truly distinct firms, and was developed by McCay
and Creed for the surf clam and ocean quahog fishery (updated periodically). This
owner file, which maps vessels onto individual firms, is crucial to assessing the
change in fleet composition over time. The creation of the owner database is detailed
elsewhere [25], and an outline is provided in the Appendix. Firms were then
characterized as processor owned (vessels and/or ITQs owned by a firm that
processes clam products) or not processor owned. A firm not owned by a processor
was then further classified by the number of vessels it owned while it was harvesting
clams: independent firms own less than three vessels and fleet firms own more than
two vessels. This delineation was used to reflect the dominant social stratification in
the fishery [20].
7Logbook data were provided through a research agreement with the Northeast Fisheries Science
Center of the National Marine Fisheries Service.
8Information contained in the logbooks for each trip includes: time spent fishing, time spent traveling,
quantity of each species caught. Relevant data from vessel license records include vessel characteristics:
year built, gross registered tonnage, vessel’s registered owner.
4. Composition of industry
This section presents empirical evidence of the differences in this clam fishery
under the two policy approaches. First, changes in overall fleet composition
demonstrate the impact of ITQs on industry structure. Composition of the industry
can itself be measured using three sets of indicators: first, the absolute number of
active vessels and firms in the industry; second, the distribution of active firms in the
industry by type; third, the distribution of the actual harvest by type of firm. The
issue of the distribution of ITQ ownership by firm type is discussed in the next
section.
The most striking change after the implementation of property rights was a
significant reduction in the number of vessels in the industry. This decrease is viewed
differently by economists and policymakers. Economists typically interpret this
rationalization as a social gain based on the assumption that less efficient producers
left the industry. In contrast, some policymakers, environmental groups and industry
members have portrayed this exit of vessels as evidence that industry participants
were ‘‘forced out,’’ and therefore as a social loss. However, counting all active vessels
greatly overestimates both the number of firms in the industry and the number that
then exited from it. There are two reasons the change in number of vessels misstates
the change in participation. First, a significant portion of the reduction in active
vessels is due to firms’ decisions to consolidate harvesting on fewer vessels. Second,
owners of ITQs who cease harvesting but participate in the fishery by leasing their
ITQs are overlooked by a vessel-level analysis.
4.1. Vessel and firm participation
Fig. 1 measures industry participation in three ways, showing how markedly
different conclusions could be drawn. The line graph (axis on the right) shows the
number of vessels active in the industry (Number of Boats). The bar chart (axis on
the left) shows the total number of firms active in the industry, including those
actively harvesting surf clams (Harvesting Firms) and those leasing their ITQ
allocations to harvesters (Non-Harvesting Firms). As a whole, this chart reflects the
changes in both the amount of harvesting capital and the number of firms in the
fishery caused by the implementation of ITQs.
As shown in Fig. 1, there was a notable reversal in trends in the number of active
vessels. In the early 1980s, during command and control, there was a contraction in
the industry and the number of vessels fell almost 8% between 1980 and 1983. This
downward trend reversed during the negotiation of property rights in the mid-1980s.
Between 1983 and 1986 there was a dramatic increase of 23% in the number of active
vessels, as firms put previously inactive vessels into service in order to establish a
claim under the property rights system. (Recall that prior to implementation, the
claim to property rights was associated with the vessel, not the vessel owner;
therefore, a firm needed to have vessels harvesting at the time of implementation in
order to stake its claim for ITQs.) After implementation of ITQs, on the other hand,
there was an immediate 41% reduction of capital in the fishery (from 131 vessels in
1990 to 1977 in 1991). Over the 9 years of ITQs, there was a continued decline in the
number of vessels harvesting surf clams and ocean quahogs,9 declining in total 68%
from 1990 to 1999.
From a social equity perspective, however, it is not the number of vessels per se
that is of interest, but rather the number of participants, or firms, in the industry. It
is the number and characteristics of participants (i.e. firms) that determines the
composition of the fishery and hence if the regulation is in violation of National
Standard Four. Measuring the change in the number of vessels shows us how firms
change their utilization of capital—for example, increasing capital to gain property
rights—but not the social impact on those people for whom the fishery is a business
investment. We can see in Fig. 1 that while many vessels exited the industry after
property rights, the total number of firms in the industry reveals a more complex
story.
Under command-and-control regulation, vessel owners could participate in the
industry only as harvesters. The change in the number of harvesting firms is shown
by the height of the white bars in Fig. 1. Between 1983 and 1986 there was a 19%
increase in number of firms harvesting clams, as vessel owners used this opportunity
to gain property rights. The number of firms that harvested clams fell 26% from
1986 to 1991 and 43% from 1991 to 1999. Although this decrease in number of firms
is far less than the decrease in number of vessels, it, too, overstates the exit of firms
from the industry.
Figure One: Participation of Firms vs. Number of Vessels
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Fig. 1. Participation of firms vs. number of vessels. Source: National Marine Fishery Surf Clam and
Ocean Quahog Logbooks and True Owners file.
9Henceforth surf clams and ocean quahogs are collectively referred to as clams.
Since the implementation of property rights, some firms have made a transition
from harvesting clams to a new business model where they no longer harvest but
instead generate revenue by leasing property rights to harvesting firms. These firms
are shown as the shaded bars in Fig. 1 (Non-Harvesting Firms), which represent an
increasingly large proportion of the industry. In total there has actually been an
increase of almost 6% in the number of distinct participants in the industry,
including both harvesters (who may hold ITQs) and non-harvesters who hold ITQs.
Analyses examining only the change in the number of harvesting vessels miss
important shifts in the way firms participate in the industry. Using just the number
of vessels—without matching those vessels to their owners—estimates only the
change in capital in the industry, not the change in the number of participants. As
shown with these data, the number of harvesting firms does not necessarily result in a
decline in the total number of firms in the industry. Analyses that include only vessels
as a measure of participation produce social welfare estimates that are likely to be
misleading.
4.2. Composition of industry by firm type
Firm type is critical for understanding the impact of regulatory change on industry
structure. For this analysis, firms that own one or two vessels and are not vertically
integrated with the processing sector are defined as independents; firms with three or
more boats that are not vertically integrated are defined as fleets; and firms that
harvest clams and are vertically integrated are defined as processors.10 The impact of
regulatory change on the type of firms in the industry is illustrated in Fig. 2, which
shows the change in the distribution of firms over time. The white area at the bottom
is the number of independent harvesting firms, which increases in the mid-1980s and
rapidly declines after 1990—leading observers to believe that small fishermen were
‘‘forced out’’ of the industry. The next layer is the number of fleets (horizontally
integrated harvesting firms). Above them on the graph are the processors (vertically
integrated harvesting firms). The total number of harvesting firms is then the total of
these three areas. Looking only at these harvesting firms, we see an upward trend in
the number of firms during property rights negotiations and a decline after policy
implementation, as well as a shift from independents toward integrated firms. In
1983, 74% of harvesting firms were independents, 10% were fleet owners, and 16%
were vertically integrated firms. By 1999, this distribution of harvesting firms had
shifted to 57% independents, 19% fleet owners, and 24% vertically integrated
firms—again giving the appearance that independent firms had been disadvantaged
relative to fleet owners and vertically integrated processors. However, including all
firms in the industry (including both harvesters and non-harvesters leasing their
allocations) yields a strikingly different picture.
The number of non-harvesting firms is represented by the shaded area, beginning
in 1990. (Prior to 1990, non-harvesting firms were by definition not part of the
10This definition of firm size was used because it delineates the conflicts among harvesters that have
historically existed in this fishery [20].
fishery.) Non-harvesting firms are those firms that own allocations but do not
harvest; they consist mainly of independent firms that discontinued harvesting after
receiving ITQs, with a smaller number of processors that own property rights but do
not harvest. Non-harvesters are a new sector in the fishery after 1990, and the
number of independent non-harvesting firms grew substantially from 1990 through
1999, offsetting the decline in the number of independent harvesting firms. In 1999,
the distribution of all firms in the industry was 80% independents, 7% fleet owners,
and 13% vertically integrated firms, showing little change from the situation in 1983.
Much of the rhetoric opposing ITQs uses the argument that independents are
‘‘forced out’’ under ITQs, and the reduction of capital in ITQs fisheries is often
pointed to as evidence. It is thus informative to compare firm exit under the two
policies. Over the entire 1983–1999 period, those firms that ceased harvesting, either
to become non-harvesting lessors of allocations or to exit the industry altogether,
were exclusively independents, with the exception of three vertically integrated firms.
There is no significant difference between the types of firms leaving the harvesting
sector before and after the policy change—weakening the claim that ITQs have an
unfairly negative impact on independent firms.
Figure Two:
Total Participation in Industry
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Fig. 2. Total participation in industry by firm type. Source: National Marine Fishery Surf Clam and
Ocean Quahog Logbooks and True Owners file.
4.3. Harvest by firm type
Beyond participation in the fishery (measured by number of firms), changes in the
distribution of harvests across firm types are of concern to regulators. Prior to
implementation of ITQs, processors took the largest share of annual surf clam
harvests (see Fig. 3). During restructuring immediately after ITQs, the distribution
of harvests across firm types did not significantly change. The data indicate that,
counter to fears, independents increased their share of harvests during the ITQ
period; by the 1996–1998 period, the relative position between fleets (larger-scale
harvesters) and independents had reversed, with independent firms leading fleet firms
by ten percentage points.
In summary, independent firms showed the ability to compete successfully under
ITQs—a picture that is distorted by looking solely at active vessels, not active firms.
Under ITQs, firms could participate either as active harvesters or as lessors of
allocations; ignoring the latter overstates the exit of firms from the industry, clouding
the effect of regulatory change on industry structure. Fig. 2 shows that this new
strategy was particularly important to small, independent firms, many of which
chose to cease harvesting and lease their allocations to other firms. These non-
harvesting firms are a crucial component of the fishery, and must be incorporated
into policy evaluations in order to provide a complete picture of the impact of
regulatory change.
5. Changes in allocation holdings
The previous section discusses changes in industry composition due to policy
change. Here we will look at changes in ownership of the new asset—the tradable
property right itself. Opponents of tradable property rights have asserted that the
market for quotas would present a disadvantage to small firms, thus leading to
excessive market power and domination by large firms. This concern, which has not
been adequately addressed due to difficulties in differentiating across firm types, has
25% 27%
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Fig. 3. Share of surf clam catch by firm type. Source: National Marine Fishery Surf Clam logbooks and
True Owners file. Note: Percent of catch is the average over the years indicated for the given firm type.
led to propositions to limit the trading of property rights in fisheries.11 Far from
ensuring equity, however, restricting trade in property rights has the potential to
entrench firms in their current (pre-policy change) positions, undermining the
efficiency gains from property rights [26].
Simple statistics in Table 1 and Fig. 4 show two types of changes in ownership of
tradable property rights: change in concentration and change in ownership by firm
type. The data indicate that once property rights could be traded, there was a small
increase in concentration of ownership. This increase, however, is surprisingly small
given the time span. The top three holders of quota have increased their share of the
total allocation only 6%, while the top ten owners have increased their share by
12%. These changes do not provide strong evidence of increasing concentration that
could facilitate market manipulation.
Distribution of property rights across firm types is central to the equity question.
Fig. 4 compares this distribution between the first year of ITQs (1990) and the last
year for which data are available (1999). The four categories of ownership are:
Table 1
Change in concentration of surf clam property rights ownership, 1990–1999
Top three owners Top four owners Top five owners Top ten owners
5.79% 7.94% 11.12% 11.56%
Source: Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council Surf Clams and Ocean Quahog Allocation Annual
Records.
1990
Fleet
26%
Fleet
19%
Processors
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6% Non-
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26%
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13%
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Fig. 4. Distribution of property right ownership across firm type. Source: Mid-Atlantic Fishery
Management Council Surf Clams and Ocean Quahog Allocation Annual Records and True Owners
file. Note: Deviation between quantity of ITQ ownership (Fig. 4) and harvest (Fig. 3) is due to leasing of
quota.
11Proposed reauthorizations introduced language either prohibiting trading of property rights (Senate
bill 2832, Senator Olympia Snowe (R-Maine)) or limiting trade (Senate bill 2973, Senator John Kerry (D-
Massachusetts)).
independent harvesters, fleet owners (horizontally integrated), processors (vertically
integrated), and non-harvesters (firms that own quota but do not harvest).
First, the share owned by processors has significantly decreased from 42% in 1990
to 29% in 1999. Likewise, the share owned by independent harvesters has declined,
from 26% to 13%. This has been balanced by the large increase in the property
rights owned by non-harvesting firms (including both independents and vertically
integrated firms that discontinued harvesting) from 6% to 39%—primarily due to
the dramatic shift of independent harvesters into this sector. Again, when these non-
harvesting firms are taken into account, the supposed marginalization of small
independent firms is thrown into question. Any analysis of the impact of regulatory
change must incorporate this new sector or risk mischaracterizing the transitions in
the industry.
This analysis covers the transitions in the fishery under command-and-control and
ITQs through the year 1999. The data over these years suggest trends that are
contrary to standard criticisms of ITQs. Over time, the concentration of ownership
will continue to evolve in response to fluctuations in the economic conditions in the
fishery.
6. Recommendations for ITQ design
These analyses, demonstrating the relationship between firm behavior and changes
in industry composition, are particularly relevant to the design of ITQ systems for
US fisheries, now that the moratorium on their use has expired. First, comparisons
of regulatory options must consider both the amount of capital and the number of
firms in a fishery in order to accurately assess the impact of regulation. Creating a
registry of firms owning capital prior to allocating ITQs would create an accurate
picture of industry composition by firm type, and make it possible to track the
emerging sector of firms that lease ITQs but do not harvest. Second, linking catch
history to vessel owners rather than to individual vessels would ensure that
independent firms retained the right to ITQs, even if their capital holdings are
acquired by larger firms during the negotiation period—a particular problem if
larger firms have better information about the direction of policy change. Last, free
and equal access to information about regulatory change is crucial to ensure that no
firms are disadvantaged by asymmetric information about the value of future ITQs.
7. Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to answer a critical question at the heart of the
current debate over tradable property rights: Are the economic gains from ITQs
unfairly redistributed from one group to another? To explore this question, there is
no better place to look than the surf clam industry, which was the first US federal
marine fishery to undergo the transition from command-and-control regulation to
ITQs. On balance, the claim that ITQs unfairly harm ‘‘small’’ fishermen, forcing
them out of the fishery to the benefit of larger fleets and vertically integrated
processors, is not borne out by the evidence.
Empirical analysis yields three significant results, all of which belie the supposed
inequitable effects of tradable property rights. First, the pronounced decline in the
number of active vessels in the fishery masks the fact that far fewer firms actually
exited the industry; focusing on the actual economic actors involved shows
considerably less socioeconomic dislocation than is implied by vessel-level
observations. Second, the share of harvesting firms that were independents, as well
as the share of actual harvests taken by those independents, were not adversely
affected by the change in regulatory policy, providing more evidence that small
fishermen were able to maintain or even expand their economic importance in the
fishery. Third, while property rights owned by independent harvesting firms have
decreased over the 1990–1999 period, this decrease is due to the emergence of the
non-harvesting firms, largely consisting of previously independent harvesters.
Finally, analysis of firms that exited the fishery entirely shows that the type of
firm choosing to exit did not change from the period of command-and-control
regulation to the period of ITQs.
Together, these results demonstrate that the introduction of tradable property
rights did not lead to a redistribution of welfare across different types of participants
in the industry relative to the prior management period. The most crucial lesson is
that in predicting and assessing the effects of policy change, it is the firm—not the
vessel—that is relevant from a social perspective.
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Appendix. Creation of ownership database
The ‘‘true owner’’ files were created to track the actual owners of licensed, active
surf clam vessels (SF-1 and SF-7 license) and ocean quahog vessels (SF-6 license).
The license files of the National Marine Fishery Service contain the names of those
who apply for and renew vessel licenses in these fisheries. We asked vessel owners to
review this list, which is public information, and to give us the names of the ‘‘true
owners’’, including partners, of each vessel. We used telephone surveys as well as in-
person interviews. Additional ownership information was ascertained by attending
council meetings, interviewing industry representatives, and field observations in the
primary clam ports and processing locations. For example, during the 2000 update
we visited 11 port cities and interviewed the majority of both independent harvesters
and fleet owners, approximately one half of the harvesting processors, and an
additional two processors that do not harvest. This approach is reasonable in a small
industry such as this clam fishery, where the social relationships and economics are
very closely related [27]. We focused on the fishing household as the economic unit
(following [28]). Using multiple crosschecks, we are confident that we have a high
degree of accuracy in determination of the owners, although we do not claim to
identify all relationships between kinships and silent partnerships.
This process was used to create the database in 1984–1985, and updated in 1987,
1989, 1991 and 2000. For additional information on this type of research process see
[25,27,29–32].
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